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With much of UK and Scottish environmental law presently originating in Brussels,1 experts 
have long warned of the specific challenges associated with Brexit in this sector.2 These 
concern the loss of the well-established and comparatively stable regulatory, enforcement and 
support frameworks provided by EU law. While nobody is seriously suggesting that in future 
the UK and Scotland will be incapable of upholding the rule of law on environmental 
matters, Brexit will nevertheless entail the loss of a powerful means to scrutinise and enforce 
environmental protection standards. 
Brexit is also likely to entail the loss of access to EU funding and to cooperation 
programmes that, for good or ill, presently are the lifeblood of UK environmental policy 
tools, like farm payments, conservation and research-related initiatives. Scotland has 
benefitted greatly from EU funds for environmental protection and the development of new 
low carbon technologies, like tidal energy. It also receives a disproportionately large share of 
EU farm payments. Ahead of Brexit, finding replacements for these means of support will be 
crucial.  
Finally, Brexit raises sensitive questions on the allocation of repatriated EU law and 
policy-making powers between UK and devolved administrations. When the unifying frame 
of EU law is removed, existing regulatory and policy differences between Scotland and the 
rest of the UK – on matters such as genetically modified organisms, fracking and renewable 
energy – are likely to increase. Such fragmentation in standards across the UK may well 
threaten the maintenance of present levels of environmental protection. Even more 
significantly, the spat on the European Union Withdrawal Bill (EUW Bill) has shown that the 
UK and the Scottish Governments hold rather diverging views on who should assume the 
regulatory competences presently exercised by the EU after Brexit.3  
Whoever is in charge of environmental affairs after Brexit, one thing is already clear. The 
approach envisioned in the EUW Bill could be a viable solution for some areas of 
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environmental law and policy, but not all. The reason for this lies in the fact that in some 
areas – such as, for example, chemicals or emission trading – EU law vests a great deal of 
regulatory power in EU institutions and structures, which will no longer service the UK post 
Brexit. In these areas, existing arrangements will have to be integrally revisited and replaced.  
The challenges associated with the EUW Bill therefore are not just constitutional, but 
affect the very mechanics of environmental law-making, implementation and enforcement. 
The UK and Scotland have precious little time to replace existing EU regulatory and 
enforcement structures to ensure the continuation of present levels of environmental 
protection after Brexit. 
Space precludes a detailed discussion of all emerging environmental challenges.4 This 
article therefore offers some general reflections on the likely implications of Brexit for 
environmental protection in Scotland and makes recommendations for solutions that may be 
adopted to address these.  
 
B. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-MAKING AND ITS ENFORCEMENT  
 
Scottish and UK law-makers presently are largely norm-takers and implementers of 
regulatory frameworks more often than not devised and engineered by the EU. This 
phenomenon is far from unique to EU member states. The role of the EU as a global norm-
maker and exporter has been widely reported and investigated in the literature, especially in 
relation to product standards.5 So even after Brexit, the UK will remain under pressure to 
comply with EU standards, whose reach goes well beyond the boundaries of EU 
membership.6 
Yet, the assertion that Brexit would not significantly affect environmental protection in the 
UK has been a common refrain. Broadly speaking, the argument goes as follows: the UK is 
party to virtually all major international environmental treaties; EU law often merely 
replicates international obligations; international treaty membership will remain unaffected 
by Brexit; ergo, the UK will still be subjected to international environmental law 
commitments after Brexit. Unfortunately, this argument is inaccurate for three main reasons. 
Firstly, EU environmental law often builds on and scales up obligations embedded in 
international environmental agreements, providing more ambitious levels of protection. EU 
law obligations are furthermore supported by an enforcement machinery which is much more 
vigorous than that supporting international law obligations. So unplugging from EU law will 
entail that, at least in some areas, the UK will be subjected both to lesser and less enforceable 
international environmental obligations.7  
Secondly, and crucially, the EU is party to numerous international environmental treaties 
alongside, and sometimes in lieu of, its member states.8 The international environmental 
agreements the EU has concluded in areas exclusively within its competence9 and to which 
the UK is not a party, include, for example, the 1982 Convention for the Conservation of 
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Salmon in the North Atlantic10 and the 2013 Minamata Convention on Mercury.11 After 
Brexit these international environmental agreements will no longer be formally binding on 
the UK. Measures implementing the obligations embedded in these treaties may nevertheless 
live on in UK law, insofar as they survive the exercise of ministerial powers envisioned in the 
EUW Bill,12 for example on contentious matters such as fisheries.13 Brexit will thus have the 
effect of crystallising the obligations enshrined in these international treaties as implemented 
in UK law at the time of withdrawal, but without taking into account how these obligations 
may evolve as a result of subsequent treaty amendments and/or practice. This crystallisation 
is particularly concerning, when one considers, for example, that the Minamata Convention 
sets out conditions for the handling and trade of mercury, which are likely to be revised and 
upgraded over time. After Brexit, therefore, the UK should consider ratifying these treaties in 
its own right, while at the same time closely monitoring measures translating these 
international obligations into EU law, which typically restrict the import of non-compliant 
products into the EU market.  
The situation is even more complex for so called ‘mixed agreements’ which have been 
ratified by both the EU and the UK.14 Here the question is not so much whether obligations 
enshrined in these instruments will continue to apply to the UK after Brexit, but how. 
International climate change treaties are a case in point. EU member states have opted to 
implement their commitments under these treaties jointly.15 This means, for example, that EU 
member states have common emission targets under both the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris 
Agreement, and are jointly responsible under international law for achieving them. Various 
pieces of EU law provide the details of member states’ responsibilities for achieving EU 
targets. These pieces of EU law have been treated as part and parcel of member states 
international obligations under the Kyoto Protocol and the same is expected to happen with 
the Paris Agreement. However, after Brexit, the UK will no longer be bound by EU climate 
change law. Accordingly, the scope of the UK’s international climate change obligations will 
need to be clarified.  
For example, after Brexit the UK could opt to continue implementing its commitments 
jointly with the EU, similar to European Economic Area (EEA) states Iceland, Lichtenstein 
and Norway. These states participate in the EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and 
benefit from access to funds supporting the development and application of emission 
reduction technologies to varying degrees. This arrangement requires EEA states to abide by 
EU law concerning, inter alia, emission trading, and to contribute funds to schemes devised 
to support emission reduction technologies. Whether the UK will decide to go down the same 
route as Iceland, Lichtenstein and Norway remains to be seen. What is certain is that the UK 
will have to make a decision on these issues and simply cannot expect current arrangements 
to continue.  
Making a decision on emission trading is particularly urgent. The EU ETS presently 
covers emissions from the UK’s most carbon intensive industries. The EU-ETS Directive is 
also one of the most heavily centralized pieces of EU legislation, which attributes a key role 
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to EU institutions. Should the UK leave the EU ETS, it would have to decide how to do so 
without compromising the interests of UK installations presently holding EU ETS 
allowances. The EU is already considering measures to prevent UK installations from selling 
off large amounts of allowances they will no longer be required to hold after Brexit. If the 
UK leaves the EU in 2019 without an agreement on how to handle this specific issue, the EU 
is planning to void all allowances auctioned by the UK since January 2018.16 This would 
have the effect of zeroing the value of allowances held by UK installations, engendering non 
insignificant financial losses. 
At the internal level, given that the EU ETS covers the most polluting installations in the 
UK, its replacement is essential to ensure environmental protection after Brexit. Arguably, 
these important law and policy-making decisions ought to be taken with the involvement of 
the UK Parliament,17 and in consultation with devolved administrations, rather than by the 
exercise of ministerial powers under the EUW Bill alone.18  
Furthermore, the EU ETS covers a sizeable share of Scotland’s emissions,19 making it an 
important means to achieve the targets enshrined in the Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009. 
Present constitutional arrangements limit Scotland’s powers to remain within the EU ETS, if 
it so desires. In the context of the ongoing EUW Bill debate, Scotland could demand the 
devolution of powers to negotiate and conclude international agreements that relate to the 
exercise of devolved competences. Pursuant to these new powers, Scotland could join the EU 
ETS and/or other EU schemes aimed to support climate action. While there are no precedents 
for adhesion to the EU ETS by subnational entities, some EU cooperation programmes 
already include self-governing territories that are not within the EU, like the Faroe Islands 
and Greenland.20 
More generally, the implementation of international climate change obligations after 
Brexit raises the question of the role of devolved administrations in determining the scope of 
the UK’s climate action. The Paris Agreement requires each Party to submit a ‘nationally 
determined contribution’ (NDC).21 NDCs contain the details of action to contribute to 
keeping the global temperature increase within the two degrees Celsius goal enshrined in the 
Paris Agreement. While the UK’s NDC is presently incorporated in that of the EU, after 
Brexit the UK will have to prepare and submit its own NDC. The process of drafting an NDC 
will be a novel experience for the UK, and raises the question of devolved administrations’ 
involvement in the exercise of the UK’s regained powers on climate law and policy. The 
concerted exercise of these powers is likely to be particularly tricky on matters where 
Westminster and Holyrood manifestly have different priorities, such as renewable energy. 
This intricate scenario is further complicated by the question of enforcement. EU law 
comes equipped with a supranational supervision and enforcement machinery that has 
contributed to the enhancement of environmental protection standards across the EU22 and in 
the UK, in areas such as air pollution, water quality, and waste.23  
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Enforcement of EU law chiefly rests on the supervisory powers of the EU Commission, 
which has the power to bring member states before the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). If 
found to be in breach, the member state can be asked to pay fines until the compliance issue 
has been resolved. In addition to the enforcement powers of the Commission, members of the 
public and pressure groups can initiate legal action before member state courts to request 
compliance with EU law. Conversely, the EUW Bill explicitly excludes UK liability to pay 
compensation to individuals who have suffered loss by reason of failure to implement EU 
law properly.24 
UK authorities have simply become accustomed to being under the EU Commission and 
the CJEU’s scrutiny, and the threat of economic penalties associated with these. Conversely, 
after Brexit, UK citizens will only be able to access national courts to complain about 
breaches of domestic environmental law. Coupled with the prohibitive costs of public interest 
litigation in the UK, it is hardly a surprise that numerous experts have identified the loss of 
scrutiny over the enforcement of environmental standards as a pressing concern associated 
with Brexit.25  
 
C. CONCLUSIONS: GETTING READY FOR BREXIT  
 
The complexities associated with the repatriation of EU powers require particular vigilance in 
order to ensure that environmental protection does not become an unintended casualty of 
Brexit. To address the manifold challenges associated with Brexit in the environmental 
sector, the Scottish Government and Parliament would be well advised to consider the 
following. 
Firstly, it seems necessary to develop an understanding of areas where urgent action is 
needed in order to replace EU environmental law, policy and support frameworks ahead of 
Brexit, which are of specific Scottish interest. A corollary of this is the need to identify areas 
where a UK-wide approach may be necessary. 
Secondly, Scotland should identify areas where greater devolved powers are needed to 
effectively exercise its competences on environmental matters after Brexit. These may 
include some legal capacity to enter into international agreements addressing specific 
Scottish interests, such as fisheries. 
Thirdly, links with regional and international bodies dealing with cooperation and 
capacity-building should be developed and strengthened, so as ensure that Scotland remains 
involved in transnational environmental protection debates after Brexit. 
Fourthly, avenues to ensure enhanced supervision of the implementation and enforcement 
of environmental laws after Brexit should be explored, giving consideration to proposals 
coming from civil society in this connection.26 
These actions would assist in ensuring that Scotland is an informed participant in the debate 
over the future of environmental protection in the UK after Brexit, keeping the UK 
Government under scrutiny, especially in the context of the exercise of the sweeping 
ministerial powers envisioned in the EUW Bill.  
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